Aristotle’s Functionalism: Psyche’s Relevance to Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

Abstract
While functionalism often attributes its roots to Aristotle’s On the Soul, contemporary
philosophers of mind have left behind crucial features of Aristotle’s philosophy by losing his
distinction between mind and soul. I propose a revision to our present concept of mind, instead
situating it as an aspect of the Aristotelian concept of soul, which allows for a more robust
account of functionalism that encompasses the entirety of the human being as a system of
demonstrative, functional capacities. I argue that Aristotle’s applied theory of the nature of souls
offers greater fecundity to discourse in philosophy of mind, specifically in discussions of the
possibility of strong artificial intelligence, the contemporary movement across disciplines
towards the externalized concept of mind, and in ameliorating some of the insurmountable
critiques of alternate theories of mind. Furthermore, a thoroughly Aristotelian form of
functionalism provides a possible solution the problem of holism, one of the major predicaments
contemporary functionalism faces. The Aristotelian view of the mind qua soul is to be contrasted
with Cartesian dualism as well as reductive materialism, as those are two historically-dominating
theories of mind that have defined the way in which philosophers consider the mind.

Background
Reductive materialists hold that the existing universe is only comprised of matter; that is
to say, “there is nothing over and above the physical”.1 Conversely, Descartes was the first to
champion substance dualism, which distinguishes matter and mind as two distinctly different
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substances.2 This was the catalyst to a completely new understanding of the relationship between
mind and body. Both materialism and dualism offer contributions towards our understanding of
the nature of the mind; however, each faces significant obstacles that contemporary philosophers
of mind have yet to ameliorate.3
Thomas Nagel claims, “philosophers share the general human weakness for explanations
of what is incomprehensible in terms suited for what is familiar and well understood, though
entirely different. This has led to the acceptance of implausible accounts of the mental largely
because they would permit familiar kinds of reduction.”4 Nagel recognizes the propensity for
reductive materialism; however, there is a severe deficiency one faces when claiming mental
states are fundamentally physical states: the inability to account for qualia, that is to say, for the
specifically subjective experiential aspects of the world. The “hard problem of consciousness”
defined by David Chalmers in 1995 demonstrates this continued struggle with explaining the
relation between a seemingly non-material element of the mind and a material world.5 Chalmers
offers that experience is itself a fundamental element of mind that is irreducible to a “more
fundamental” material basis; however, Chalmers does not leap to granting experience, and
therefore the subject of the experience, a separate ontological status from material. Instead, he
only grants that this understanding of the mind and subject postulates foundations “over and
above” matter. Chalmer’s “hard problem of consciousness” pulls from Thomas Nagel’s 1974
paper, “What is it Like to be a Bat?”, highlighting the difficulty of accounting for the subjective,
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experiential element of consciousness.6 Nagel argues that, while we could behave as a bat
behaves, hanging upside down, eating fruits, doing bat things, there is still something that would
distinguish our experience of acting like a bat from being a bat. That is to say, there is
something it is like to be a bat. Chalmers describes this subjective aspect as being distinctly
experiential, stating:
When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of
redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual
field….Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images
that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a
stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is
something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.7
Each of these elements of subjectivity indicates a subjectivity that would be insufficiently
explained utilizing materialism.
Conversely, dualism has yet to offer a solution to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia’s
counterargument to substance dualism.8 She posited that discussing causation from one
substance to another is wildly problematic. In order for something to be non-physical, it cannot
exist in space or presence in the material world, so the possibility of it having causal power on
the tangible world requires a strange explanation. One is forced to mediate this mind-body
interaction problem in order to explain the causal relationship between, for example, the body
being hurt and the mind feeling pain.9
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It is worth pointing out here as well that this idea of the mind feeling pain as an experiential phenomenon is more
than compatible with an Aristotelian understanding of the human, that is to say that it is the mind that is realizing the
capacity to be in pain, rather than the c-fibers “experiencing” pain or a disconnected cogito that happens to
experience the correlating bodily experiences of the subject.

For both dualists and materialists, the largest theoretical obstacle is this relationship
between mind and body, subjectivity and material objectivity, regardless of whether one grants a
unique ontological status to the mind that sets it apart from the rest of the world.
The basic premise of functionalism is that mind can be understood through the
summation of three parts: environmental stimuli acting on the subject, mental states as a
complex, interrelated system, and the consequent functional and behavioral outputs.10 A single
mental state, then, is the node situated at the intersection between these three elements, with the
mental state being defined purely in terms of the individual function it performs within the larger
system.
Functionalism’s historical foundations are often attributed to Aristotle. This basis can be
found in his work De Anima (On the Soul), which defines the soul biologically, as stated, “... the
(human) soul is to be identified with whichever powers and capacities enable a natural,
organized human body to fulfill its defining function, which, according to Aristotle, is to survive
and flourish as living, acting, perceiving, and reasoning being.”11 In this way, Aristotle
establishes the foundations for an explanation of the relationship between the soul and the body
that avoids the problems that have arisen in other theories of mind and soul across the following
two thousand years.12
One of the major aspects of functionalism that itself challenges a materialist framework is
the concept of multiple realizability. This defines mental states in terms of roles realized in the
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world rather than physical composition. This distinguishes functionalism from materialism and
dualism because of the possibility of this realization across material compositions. For the
functionalist, the matter is not the sufficient cause of the mental state, but rather, is a necessary
cause for it.13

Psyche
Aristotle recognizes ψυχή (psyche, soul) as the entirety of a living thing, the combination
of all of its capacities to act within the world.14 That is to say, rather than defining the soul as
immaterial and separable from the body, Aristotle defines the soul biologically. The soul is
defined hierarchically based on these capacities, with plants possessing a nutritive soul,
reflecting the ability to grow, reproduce, and take in nutrients. Animals have sensitive souls, as
they have all of the capacities of plants, as well as the additional facility to move of their own
volition and to perceive the world around them, both of which are necessary for them to interact
with the world. Humans are the only living things with the capacity to think, reason, and
imagine, in addition to all of those possessed by animals and plants. In this way, these capacities
are necessarily realized from one “soul-tier” to the next, building in a way that allows for lowerlevel faculties (consuming energy, reproduction) to exist without higher-level processes(desires,
thoughts, sensations), but not vice-versa.
Unlike the other metaphysical commitments of contemporary philosophy of mind,
Aristotle’s psyche is conducive to recognizing the soul as distinguished from the body, without
facing the mind-body problem. In De Anima, Aristotle states:
13
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It is not necessary to ask whether soul and body are one, just as it is not necessary
to ask whether the wax and its shape are one, nor generally whether the matter of
each thing and that of which it is the matter are one.15
Here Aristotle is discussing the inseparability of the psyche from its matter, that they are neither
two separate things nor are they identical to one another; their inseparable juxtaposition just is
what comprises an organism. Aristotle’s point that the mind and the body are two aspects of a
single entity avoids the difficulty substance dualism has of accounting for the causal relation
between the mind-substance and the body-substance. Rather than attempting to answer how a
wax and its shape can be related, Aristotle finds this question to be incomprehensible; there is no
causal relationship between the wax and its form, as they are one and the same.
i. Nous
As aforementioned, Aristotle says psyche throughout De Anima in reference to the
entirety of the actualized soul, while using a different term to discuss the mind:
νους (nous). Nous is characterized to be the intellect, or reason, of the person, considered to be
the part of the soul that has the capacity to know and understand. This further distinguishes the
mind to be functional in its definition, recognizing it as possessing capacities to be realized in
function. Aristotle characterizes the mind by saying, “That part of the soul…which we call mind
(by mind I mean that part by which the soul thinks and forms judgments) had no actual existence
until it thinks.”16 This is to say, the mind just is the realization of our capacity to think and
reason. While it ought to be acknowledged that Aristotle never specifically spoke of mental
states as such, it seems this narrower understanding of the mind as specifically the part of us that
contributes the capacities to think and utilize rationality offers a definitive view of the elements
that distinguish humans as distinctly thinking creatures.
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Benefits of Adopting Psyche
Richard Sorabji, in his article “Body and Soul in Aristotle”, defends the necessity for the
continued utilization of “soul” in Aristotle because, as he says,
The word ‘soul’ may sound archaic to some modern ears, and people may be
tempted to substitute the word ‘mind’. But then they are likely to confine the
functions of the soul to what we call mental acts, and this will take them away
from Aristotle’s conception of the soul.17
I take this point made by Sorabji to be a central tenet, as understanding Aristotle’s psyche
requires us to abandon our contemporary interpretation of the soul as an archaic, spiritual entity
in favor of an (admittedly counterintuitive) understanding of the soul deeply rooted in biology.
While this may appear to be descriptive of the soul, rather than definitive, Richard
Sorabji interprets, “Aristotle’s statement, that the most appropriate account of the soul is the one
which picks out these capacities, already suggests the thought that perhaps the soul just is these
capacities. This thought is confirmed when we notice that Aristotle speaks of the capacities as
parts of the soul”. Moreover, in Aristotle’s own words, he demands a “non-aggregative form of
unity” in discussing the nature of these capacities.18
This understanding of the human as a series of realized capacities when added to
functionalism has multifaceted implications on our understanding of the mind in the world. A
deeply biological account of the soul, and therefore understanding of the mind and human
consciousness, contributes additional necessary requirements for artificial intelligence to be
recognized as such. This situates the role of non-mental, experienced phenomena and the
relationship between animal cognition to human cognition as well. Additionally, adopting the
biological psyche in conjunction with nous as realized capacities further situates the mind as a
reflection of the movement in cognitive science and philosophy of mind toward externalized
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(“E”) theories of mind. Lastly, this may offer a possible solution to the problem of holism
obstructing functionalist theories.
Alan Turing offered an inherently behaviorist account of artificial intelligence, positing
the situation such that if a person were to have a conversation with a computer and found the
computer indistinguishable from communication with another human being, this computer would
be demonstrating human-like sentience. John Searle, in his Chinese Room argument, responded
that if someone were in a room and had a complex enough set of instructions, one could claim to
“know” Chinese without understanding a lick of it. That is to say, certain inputs of words in
Chinese would have specific character responses that the person in the room could copy down in
response. With enough complexity, the person inputting bits of conversational Chinese (who is
presumably fluent in Chinese) would find the responses indistinguishable from another fluent
Chinese speaker, all the while the individual inside has no necessary understanding of Chinese.
The same could be applied to AI, says Searle, as behaving like a human could be achieved
without internal processes of consciousness reflecting our own.
To adopt Aristotle’s soul is to recognize that the communicative and computational
elements of the human mind is conceptually dependent upon the fulfillment of necessary lowerlevel capacities, such as the capacities to reproduce, take in nutrients, and grow. For these to be
taken as necessary to having a rational soul, and therefore nous, it would then by extension be
necessary for strong AI to realize these capacities as well. This would mean an artificially
intelligent thing would have to realize all of the necessary functions and capacities of a human
being, not just the performative element of conversational communication. This seems to reflect
and cement a more succinct requirement for strong AI, as the Turing Test recognizes the

importance of behavior, but does not seem to encompass the extent to which the consciousness
seems to be intimately connected with the complexity of the human experience with the world.
This ultimately has further interesting implications on the relationship between certain
behaviors exhibited in both humans and animals that have not been understood in the context of
life. An example that comes to mind is the understanding of sleep. Viewing living things as
conglomerations of capacities rooted in biology, some of which being necessary to and definitive
of the essence of the living thing, would offer a place in which sleep could be recognized as a
necessarily-realized capacities within the sensitive soul (animals), and by extension, the rational
soul (humans). This reflects our understanding of similarities in behavior between non-human
animals and people, essentially validating experiences of the world that seem to cross the
boundary between mental experiences (of feeling sleepy or tired, inability to concentrate or think
at full capacity) and biological impulses (physical weakness, nodding off).
The second addition this understanding of the soul offers is that this seems to ultimately
be reflective of the movement in philosophy of mind and cognitive science toward “E” theories
of mind. In other words, theories such as David Chalmers and Andy Clark’s “Extended Mind”
thesis and others’ work in “Embedded”, “Embodied”, and “Enacted” cognition.19 In the case of
extended mind, this is illustrated in the functional equivalence of some isolated minds to other
minds acting in conjunction with an external aid. The example given in Chalmers’ essay is that
of two people going to the museum for the day, one with a perfectly functioning memory and
capability to arrive at the museum (Inga), the other with some sort of memory problems,
19
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resulting in a dependence upon a notebook to aid him (Otto). If we are to understand the mind as
functional, and one mind functions equivalently to another than utilizes an external aid, it would
thus be understood that the mind would extend beyond physical limitations of the brain to
encompass the external element (in this case, Otto’s notebook). The relationship with Aristotle’s
psyche, then, is that through understanding the entirety of a person through such realized
capacities as the ability to experience the world through sensation and move around in it, is to
define what is it to be human in terms of a necessary relationship to the external world.
According to Aristotle’s characterization, the possibility of the rational soul existing predicates
upon an established, realized relationship with the external world. An enactivist, who would
claim cognitive capacities are deeply interrelated and dependent upon interaction with the
external world would I think be quite enthusiastic about the implications of Aristotle’s view of
the soul, as the possibility of having a rational soul only arises once the capacities of the sensitive
soul have been realized.
The problem of holism in functionalism states that if the entire system of mental states
that comprises our understanding of the mind requires the complex interconnection between
various beliefs and internal states in order to exhibit any one mental state; other people who do
not share the same internal states would be incapable of expressing the same mental states as
another person. Considering functionalism relies on this interdependence of mental states to
define the mind, any variation in individual mental states results in this change in the
composition of the whole structure. That is to say, if holism is true, with one slight variation in
mental states, two individuals who both believe that it is raining in Oregon today would be
unable to have the exact same belief, despite it appearing that they ought to be able to. This
destabilizes our ability to discuss the mind as a universally applicable concept to humanity, as

each representation of the mind would be defined by a variety of different systems. In order to
define the mind, there must be a cohesion across all minds, regardless of whether that coherence
is based in functionalism or not. This cohesion, with the addition of the psyche, could be thought
of through these underlying capacities. Having a static conglomeration of capacities groups all
people together as being fundamentally the same, while allowing for the differences holism
posits in the realization of those capacities.

Conclusion
Functionalism steers a middle path between extreme reductive materialism and Cartesian
dualism in a way that quite clearly parallels Aristotle’s discussion of the soul. This offers a
mechanism for understanding our place in the world beyond reductive means without making
assumptions about the nature of the mind. Ultimately, Aristotle’s concept of psyche results in a
theory of mind consistent with contemporary understandings of the relationship between mind
and its environment, a notion that is altogether novel in its antiquity. Although an Aristotelian
view of mind, soul, and matter may not be the absolute answer to all future enquiry, revisiting his
metaphysics and psychology has demonstrable benefits conducive to the movements in
philosophy of mind in cognitive science surrounding “E” theories of mind, a more thorough
recognition of the relationship between the mind as soul as capacities and the recognition of its
effects in the world, the reimagining of how we can tackle the problems functionalism faces, and
ultimately, a fresh perspective devoid of entrenchment, through which we can recognize that
materialism and dualism are not exhaustive options for understanding the mind.
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